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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Y I·~TZEN H. DEMOOR, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. Case 
P.\lfL PAULUS and FOGG AND 
BR:\D\~ FURNITURE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
No. 9941 
Defendant and Appellant 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO FIND 
PLA'\INTIFF CONTRIBUTORILy NEGLIGENT AS 
.-\ ~f:\TTER OF LAW. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED 
TO FIND THERE WAS ANY CAUSAL RELATION-
SHIP BETWEEN ANY CLAIMS OF CONTRIBU-
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TORY NEGLIGENCE AS CLAIMED BY THE 
DEFENDANT AND rfHE COLLISION. 
POINT III 
THE FACTS AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL 
COURT SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. 
POINT IV 
IT IS THE DUTY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
TO REVIEW THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE FINDINGS, AND 
THEY MUST BE ALLOWED TO STAND IF 
REASONABLE MINDS COULD AGREE WITH 
THEM. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover for property damage sus-
tained as a result of the collision of two vehicles in Ogden 
City, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURTS 
This action was originally commenced in the Ogden 
City Court. The case was first tried in the Ogden City 
Court on June 26, 1962. On September 17, 1962, Judg-
ment was entered in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendant for the sum of $230.91. Defendant ap-
pealed to the District Court of Weber County. On April 
30, 1963, this action was tried de novo before the District 
Court of Weber County. Again judgment was entered in 
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fa\·or of plaintiff and against the defendant. Judgment 
in thr District Court of Weber County was for $242.99, 
together with costs in the sum of $26.80. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent is not entirely in agreement with appel-
lant's statement of the facts, and therefore re-states facts 
pertinent to the issues before the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah on appeal. 
This case involves a motor vehicle collision which 
occurred on May 19, 1961, at approximately 2017 South 
\Vashington Boulevard in Ogden, Utah. Defendant Paul 
Paulus had delivered some furniture to a furniture store 
located at 2017 South Washington Boulevard for the 
defendant Fogg and Brady Furniture Company, his em-
ployer (T24-25). His truck had been parked parallel to 
the curb (T31- Note: Witness refers to vehicle as 
having been parked "straight". Further elaboration of 
testimony required drawings on blackboard in view of 
apparent language barrier.). 
Plaintiff made a right tum from 20th Street onto 
\Vashington Boulevard and proceeded south thereon 
(T12). Plaintiff saw defendant's truck at the curb and 
noticed that it \vas apparently pulling away from the 
curb, so the plaintiff moved his vehicle over to the left 
portion of the highway designated for southbound traffic 
to leave enough room for defendant to pull away from 
the curb and proceed on his \\:ay (T12). The defendant 
unexpectedly proceeded from the curb at a surprising, 
unusual and awkward angle and in a southeasterly direc-
tion (T31). 
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While the plaintiff, Mr. Demoor, had moved his 
vehicle from the right side of the roadway next to the 
west curbline towards the center of the road to give the 
truck room enough to pull out and proceed straight ahead, 
to his surprise, and for no apparent reason, the truck 
proceeded in a southeasterly direction twenty feet until 
impact (T29). 
While defendant Paul Paulus was not too consistent 
in his testimony, he did state that he did not see plaintiff's 
automobile until about the time the impact occurred 
(T22). 
The impact occurred at a point twenty feet east of 
the west curb line. It occurred between the left front of 
the defendant's truck and on the right side of the plain-
tiff's automobile. The damage on plaintiff's automobile 
commenced at the front door and continued back along 
the right side of the car through the right rear fender 
(T13). The right front fender was not involved (T19). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO FIND 
PIJAINTIFF CONTRIBUTORIL t'" NEGLIGENT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW. 
The study of an automobile collision is probably best 
initiated by attempting to sift through all of the evidence 
to ascertain what really happened. 
An individual about to be involved in a collision is 
not always the keenest of observers. The physical evidence 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
left at the scene of a collision offers a greater degree of 
reliability as to \vhat really happened. 
While the appellant contends that defendant was not 
moving at the time the impact occurred, the evidence 
shows this is not true. 
The plaintiff, Yetzen H. Demoor, observed that de-
fendant's vehicle was in motion at the time the impact 
occurred (T29). The physical evidence substantiates this. 
The damage to plaintiff's vehicle commenced at the 
right front door and involved the right side of the car 
from the front door back to and including the right rear 
fender. The right front fender was not damaged (T13). 
Had defendant's vehicle been motionless at the time of 
impact, it is obvious that the right side of plaintiff's car 
could not have been damaged without some damage 
occurring to the right front fender. The only way in which 
the damage could have occurred as it did was for de-
fendant's vehicle to have been in motion at the moment 
of impact as observed by the plaintiff. 
While defendant repeatedly refers to his truck as 
being a "large van-type truck", no measurements were 
introduced into the evidence which would indicate its 
actual size. There is no evidence tending to indicate it 
was anything more than the normal type of small van 
used by many businesses for delivery purposes. The dimen-
sions of many of the smaller vans are really not much dif-
ferent from the dimensions of a normal American automo-
bile. The different type of construction gives them more 
interior room, but external dimensions are not necessarily 
much different. 
The most striking point of interest is that defendant's 
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truck, after impact, was still facing in a southeasterly 
direction when its left front fender was twenty feet east 
of the west curb line. 
This Court has often stated that the trial court sits 
at a decided advantage over the Supreme Court when it 
comes to ascertaining facts. This case is certainly illus-
trative of this principle. On page 30 of the transcript 
of testimony, the trial judge was very concerned over 
certain key factors. He asked the officer to step to the 
board and indicate the angle of the truck when the 
officer first saw it. The officer drew the angle of the truck 
on the blackboard. The trial court was able to observe the 
awkward and unusual angle at which the truck had pro-
ceeded from the curbline. The Supreme Court now sits 
at a definite disadvantage because the blackboard, I am 
sure, has long since been erased and this picture is no 
longer available for evidence. 
Counsel for plaintiff, for purposes of attempting to 
have some record on this item, asked the officer: 
"Q Officer, it would appear from the board that 
you have the truck facing - . 
A It would be facing southeast. 
MR. SCHOENHALES: At a fairly acute angle. 
A Yes sir. 
MR. SCHOENHALES: No further questions." 
(T30). 
You would certainly not expect a driver to move a 
vehicle from a curbline at such an angle and so far out 
into the street. It is difficult to conceive of Where Mr. 
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Paul Paulus intended to go or \vhere he would have gone 
had he not ben involved in this collision. 
Defendant concedes on page 8 of his brief that plain-
tiff has a right to assume other drivers on the highway 
will obey the law and act with due care. 
41-6-68 Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides: 
"Starting vehicles. No person shall start a 
vehicle which is stopped, standing or parked un-
less and until such movement can be made with 
reasonable safety. 
41-6-69 Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides: 
HSignals on turning, stopping or suddenly 
decreasing speed - When turning permissible. -
(a) No person shall turn a vehicle at an inter-
section unless the vehicle is in proper position upon 
the roadway as required in Section 41-7-66, or 
tum a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway 
or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course 
or move right or left upon a roadway unless and 
until such movement can be made with reasonable 
safety. No person shall turn any vehicle without 
giving an appropriate signal in the manner here-
inafter provided in the event any other traffic may 
be affected by such movement. 
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left 
shall be given continuously during not less than the 
last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. 
(c) No person shall stop suddenly decrease 
the speed of a vehicle without first giving an ap-
propriate signal in the manner provided herein 
to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the 
rear \vhen there is opportunity to give such a 
signal.., 
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Plaintiff Y etzen H. Demoor had a right to rely on the 
assumption that defendant would use due and reasonable 
care and act as required by the above-quoted statutes in 
the operation of his vehicle, and that he would operate it 
in a normal, lawful manner. He had a right to rely on 
this assumption until circumstances warned him, or in 
the exercise of due care should have warned him, to the 
contrary. 
Plaintiff saw defendant's vehicle begin to pull away 
from the curb, so plaintiff changed his course of travel 
and moved towards the center of the sighway so as to 
leave enough room for defendant to pull out and proceed 
in a normal manner down the highway. To plaintiff's 
great surprise, defendant continued to proceed out onto 
the highway in a southeasterly direction to such an extent 
that the plaintiff was unable to avoid a collision. 
Where was Mr. Demoor's automobile when he first 
observed the defendant start to move? On page 17 of the 
transcript of testimony, Mr. Demoor stated that his car 
would be completely in a southbound position when he 
observed the defendant's vehicle start to move. He went 
to the blackboard and placed an "x" where he was when 
he first saw it. As further indicated on page 17 of the 
transcriptof testimony, he then took a piece of chalk and 
traced his path on the blackboard. 
Here once again the Supreme Court is a distinct 
disadvantage to the trial court in attempting to ascertain 
facts because we do not have the benefit of this black-
board ,vhich is so often referred to in the transcript of 
testimony and upon which the diagram of the collision, 
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position of vehicles and paths vehicles traveled were 
traced. 
Defendant's evidence simply does not establish that 
the plaintiff was negligent in failing to anticipate or fore-
see the defendant would take a southeasterly course or 
travel out towards the middle of the street to point of 
impact twenty feet east of the west curbline, a distance 
equivalent to two normal lanes of traffic. The reasonable, 
prudent man certainly would have expected defendant 
\vould proceed in a southerly direction and in the proper 
lane of travel far short of the twenty feet he traveled to 
the point of impact. 
In attempting to view the facts of this case as they 
\\·ould start to unfold to the plaintiff shortly prior to the 
collision, it is easy to see and understand why his conduct 
was reasonable and prudent. As he was proceeding south 
on Washington Boulevard, he observed a truck commence 
to move from the curb, so the plaintiff moved towards the 
center of the highway to allow the truck enough room 
to pull out and proceed normally down the street. With 
no apparent warning or signal, instead of proceeding 
normally down the street after pulling out, the truck pro-
ceeded in a southeasterly direction twenty feet out into 
the street. Certainly no one would expect such a strange, 
awkward maneuver. It is difficult to conceive of where 
the defendant was actually intending to proceed. It can-
not be said as a matter of law that the plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent for having moved over towards the 
left of the highway in order to allow the truck enough 
room to pull out normally onto the highway instead of 
slamming on his brakes. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED 
TO FIND THERE WAS ANY CAUSAL RELATION-
SHIP BETWEEN ANY CLAIMS OF CONTRIBU-
TORY NEGLIGENCE AS CLAIMED BY THE 
DEFENDANT AND THE COLLISION. 
It is, of course, elementary that before the negligence 
of either party to a lawsuit will have any effect upon 
legal relationships, it must bear a proximate causal rela-
tionship. Equated in terms of this particular case, if a 
reasonable, prudent person would have been able to 
ascertain thatt defendant was not going to yield the right 
of way to plaintiff, that he was going to proceed out into 
the street at such an awkward southeasterly angle, re-
gardless of the presence of plaintiff, could such reason-
able, prudent person take such evasive action so as to 
a void the collision? 
Defendant presented no evidence on this point. It is 
difficult for the writer to see how the trial court could 
have reached a result other than to refuse to find de-
fendant had met his burden of proof on this point. 
In view of the extreme angle at which the defendant's 
truck porceeded out onto the highway, and in view of 
the fact it was still moving at impact, it is difficult to 
see how this collision could have been avoided unless a 
driver were possessed with such clairvoyant powers that 
he could have read the defendant's mind and ascertained 
that these surprising and unexpected movements would 
be made. 
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POINT III 
·rilE F AC.-fS AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL 
COURT SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has re-
peatedly held that the nice adjustment of rights and 
duties of drivers and the intricate questions pertaining 
thereto are primarily problems to be resolved by the 
trier of fact. Only when reasonable minds could not differ 
in reaching a contrary determination does it become 
necessary to upset such factual resolutions. Country Club 
Foods vs. Barney, 10 U. 2d 317, 352 P. 2d 776 clearly 
sets forth the law on this point. 
When this case was first tried in the Ogden City Court 
before the Honorable Charles Sneddon, the issues were 
found in favor of the plaintiff - respondent herein -
and against the defendant - appellant herein. When 
this case was tried a second time before the District Court 
of Weber County, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist 
again found the issues in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant. 
We have no accurate calibration as to how far it is 
from the comer of Washington Boulevard and 20th 
Street to 2017 Washington Boulevard. The officer quessed 
it \Vould be between one hundred and one hundred fifty 
feet (T5). Since the "x" placed on the blackboard in the 
District Court of Weber County indicating where the 
plaintiff \vas "·hen he first observed the defendant has 
long since been erased, the Supreme Court is at a de-
cided disadvantage to the trial court in attempting to 
ascertain facts. 
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As noted from the Country Club Foods vs. Barney 
case, the policy of this Supreme Court has been that 
where reasonable minds could differ in resolving questions 
of contributory negligence and proximate cause, the 
Supreme Court cannot disturb the trial judge's deter-
mination of them. 
The facts of this case compel affirmation of the judg-
ment of both trial courts in which this case was previously 
tried. 
POINT IV 
IT IS THE DUTY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
TO REVIEW THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE FINDINGS, AND 
THEY MUST BE ALLOWED TO STAND IF 
REASONABLE MINDS COULD AGREE WITH 
THEM. 
The transcript of testimony in this case shows without 
a doubt that a great deal of the testimony centered around 
drawings made on a blackboard during the trial of the 
case. Near the close of the trial, the trial judge wished 
to ascertain pertinent facts which hold the key to the 
solution of the legal and factual problems to be resolved, 
so he had the investigating officer step to the board and 
emphasize through the diagram angles of vehicles and 
so forth (T30, 31). 
The blackboard, of course, is not available now for 
the Supreme Court to observe, placing the Supreme 
Court at a decided disadvantage to the trial court. 
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In the case of Sine vs. Salt Lake Transportation Com-
pany, found at 106 U. 289, 147 P. 2d 875, the Supreme 
Court of Utah pronounced the law in this jurisdiction 
to be that in a law case, appeal is on question of law 
alone. That being true, the function of the Supreme Court 
is not to pass on the weight of the evidence nor to deter-
mine conflicts therein but to examine it solely for the 
purposeof determining whether or not the judgment finds 
substantial support in the evidence. In so examining the 
c\'idcnce, all reasonable presumptions are in favor of the 
trial court's findings and judgment, and the evidence 
must be considered in the light most favorable to them. 
If the findings and judgment are substantially supported 
by the evidence, then the supreme Court may not disturb 
them. 
Again in Lawrence vs. Bamberger Railroad Company, 
found at 3 U. 2d 247, 282 P. 2d 335, the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah stated: 
"When the court has made findings and entered 
judgment thereon as was done here, it is then our 
duty to review the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the findings, and they must be allowed to 
stand if reasonable minds could agree with them. 
Likewise every reasonable intendment ought to be 
indulged in favor of the validity and correctness 
of the judgment under review, and it will not be 
distrubed unless the appellant meets his burden of 
affirmatively showing error." 
The points of law set forth in the foregoing Utah 
Supreme Court cases have been restated many, many, 
times in many, many other cases before the Utah Supreme 
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Court, and it is safe to say that the law is well settled in 
this jurisdiction that the trier of fact is at a decided 
advantage in such matters as observing the demeanor of 
the witnesses, assessing the crediblity of the witnesses, in 
observing the inflections in their voices, \vhich are often-
times extremely meaningful, and in many other ways. 
Appellant has simply failed to show that there is any 
reason for disturbing the findings of the trial court in this 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, 
and plaintiff awarded costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARK, JOHNSON, 
SCHOENHALS & ROBERTS 
By --------------------------------------------------
Robert E. Schoenhals 
903 Keams Building, 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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